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Abstract
This paper argues that New Labour’s devolution proposals can be seen as part of a strategy 
of « political distinction » from the Conservative party, all the more necessary as there had 
been a conspicuous convergence in most other policy areas. After retracing the history of 
Labour attitudes towards Home Rule on the periphery of the United Kingdom in the XXth 
century, the paper focuses on the contemporary period, suggesting that  Thatcherism was 
perceived as an “alien” doctrine in both Scotland and Wales, thus hardening the resolve of a 
significant part of the population to loosen or break the old constitutional ties. It is against 
this background that New Labour’s positioning as the party of movement is discussed. It is 
argued that, in Scotland, two factors contributed to making constitutional reform 
unavoidable from the 1980s on : a major shift in favour of Scottish autonomy in both the 
cultural and intellectual fields and the creation of a “popular front” in favour of 
constitutional reform in the shape of the Scottish Constitutional Convention. The paper 
concludes on a discussion of the contrasting positions of Vernon Bogdanor and Tom Nairn 
of the state that the United Kingdom is in today.
Résumé
Cet article considère que les propositions de réforme des néo-travaillistes concernant la 
dévolution doivent être appréhendées comme faisant partie d’une stratégie de « distinction 
politique » par rapport au parti conservateur, rendue d’autant plus nécessaire par la forte 
convergence dans la plupart des autres domaines. Après avoir retracé l’évolution du 
positionnement travailliste sur la question de l’autonomie de la périphérie britannique au 
cours du XXe siècle, l’analyse se centre sur la période contemporaine. Au cours des années 
quatre-vingt, le thatchérisme est de plus en plus perçu, en Ecosse comme au pays de Galles 
comme une doctrine étrangère (aux traditions politiques et philosophiques de ces deux pays), 
et cette perception renforce la détermination d’une partie de la population de desserrer, voire 
de rompre les vieux liens constitutionnels. C’est en tenant compte de cette contrainte, que 
l’on doit analyser le nouveau positionnement des travaillistes comme le parti du mouvement 
constitutionnel. Deux facteurs en Ecosse ont rendu la réforme constitutionnelle difficile à 
éviter pour les néo-travaillistes: un changement significatif en faveur de l’autonomie dans les 
champs intellectuel et culturel et la construction d’un « front populaire » en faveur du 
changement, sous la forme de la Convention Constitutionnelle Ecossaise. L’article se termine 




Nationalisme écossais et gallois, dévolution, néo-travaillisme
Introduction
If the Labour party became New Labour with the arrival of Anthony Blair as leader in 1994, the 
process  of  transformation  which  led  to  and  accelerated  under  New  Labour  began  –  most 
observers would agree – a decade earlier. With 28.3% of the vote in the general election of 1983 
the Labour party registered its lowest score since the introduction of full adult suffrage in 1918. 
This was the alarm signal that was to trigger, under the successive leaderships of Neil Kinnock, 
John Smith and Anthony Blair, the process which is often described in both the hagiographic and 
the academic  literature  on the subject  as  the «  modernization  »  of  the  Labour party  and its 
policies. As I have explained at length elsewhere (Dixon 1998, 2003, 2005) I would prefer the 
notion of « conspicuous convergence », as developed among others by Colin Hay (1999), to the 
modernization thesis1 which has become part of the Blairites’ (now jaded) self-image. From the 
mid-eighties on, the leadership of the Labour party, when faced with the on-going successes of 
the Thatcher governments, adopted a policy of gradual accommodation with the new policy mix 
that had been introduced by the radical Conservatives, thus creating a new « common sense » of 
government.  This process of policy accommodation was to be more publicly proclaimed and 
more explicitly theorized under the new New Labour leadership, with some considerable help 
from Anthony Giddens (1994, 1998), first among others in what had become the New Labour 
organic intelligentsia. 
By 1996, when Blair published his first collection of speeches and newspaper articles as Labour 
leader, entitled New Britain. My vision of a young country, the contours of New Labour economic and 
social policy were relatively plain to see, for anyone willing to read through Blair’s not always 
inspiring prose and look beyond the rhetorical gimmicks. The paradigms of economic and social 
management of Britain that had been introduced by Margaret Thatcher, which included a large 
degree of privatization, flexible labour markets, a reformed and wealthy-friendly fiscal structure 
and a legally constrained trade union movement, would be kept by an incoming Labour 
government. The reality of New Labour government since 1997 has given ample proof that 
Blair’s promises have been kept, sometimes quite zealously so. Privatization has continued in one 
or other of its various forms (the dominant one being that which was borrowed from John Major 
in the form of the Private Finance Initiative - now rebaptized Public-Private Partnerships); labour 
market flexibility is considered to be so important that successive New Labour Foreign Ministers 
have insisted on its serving as a model for the rest of archaic Old Europe2; Britain continues to 
be a low-tax regime, and to attract capital and labour for that reason; if the trade unions have 
seen their legal situation somewhat improved (with the right to trade union organization in the 
workplace now officially recognized) there has been no return to the trade union rights of the 
pre-Thatcher period, and the leader of New Labour has regularly shown his distaste for 
traditional forms of trade union action and adopted a rhetoric more familiar within the 
Conservative tradition when confronted with striking workers. Similarly, in the area of foreign 
1 This is best exemplified in the hagiographic literature produced by Blair’s inner circle. See, for example, Peter 
Mandelson, The Blair Revolution Revisited (Mandelson, 2002).
2 This is a central theme of the « Blair-Schröder platform » for the European elections of 1999. In this joint 
policy document which bears the hallmark of Peter Mandelson, labour market flexibility is presented as the way 
forward from “old” Euopean rigidities. The German social democrats were to be thereafter less enthusiastic in 
their endorsement of Blairism after disastrous results in these elections.
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policy the path followed by New Labour has been one of sometimes spectacular convergence 
around policies initiated by successive American presidents, Democrat and Republican, thus 
transforming the relatively novel and much discussed ideological proximity between Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan into a model of contemporary Anglo-American relations. 
The policy convergence between the New Thatcherite Right and New Blairite Labour has been 
such that the title of Simon Jenkins’ recent book on the relationship between M. Thatcher, J. 
Major, A. Blair and G. Brown – Thatcher and Sons (2006) – seems much more flatly descriptive and 
much less provocative than the author no doubt hoped. Given this extraordinary convergence, 
the problem for New Labour, at least in the early years of its rise to power, has been how to 
demarcate  itself  in  this  relationship  of  ideological  fellow  travellership  with  Conservative 
neoliberalism. I will suggest here that devolution, and more generally constitutional reform, have 
been one of the major elements in what we might like to call  New Labour’s strategy  of  political  
distinction.  Although in the areas of economic,  social,  penal  and foreign policy the divergence 
between the two major parties has been a matter of what Freud described in another context as « 
the  narcissism  of  minor  differences  »  Conservative  and  New  Labour  attitudes  towards 
constiutional reform over the last twenty years have been strikingly at odds with each other.
1. Labour, old and new, and the National Question
There were no particular reasons why this should be so. Both parties had come to see the British 
union as the only viable framework in which to operate effectively. The Conservatives had of 
course been more vocal in their opposition to any form of Home Rule from the late XIXth 
century on. In their early manifestations the labour movement and the first political organizations 
to  emerge  from that  movement  were  in  favour  of  the  demands  for  Home  Rule  expressed 
forcefully in Ireland and less so in Scotland (Harvie 1989). However, by the 1920s there is an 
observable parting of the ways between the Home Rulers and the socialists, with some notable 
exceptions (one thinks of Roland Muirhead in Scotland, for example). In the inter-war period in 
both Scotland and Wales,  not  to mention England,  the  demands for recognition of national 
particularities in the cultural and political fields seemed at best an irritation as class issues came to 
the fore. The ambiguity, in political terms, of the nationalist movements in both Scotland and 
Wales,  the  propensity  for  certain  of  their  leaders  to  lean  heavily  towards  the  Right  and  to 
manipulate the dynamite of xenophobia were to confirm many Socialists in their hostility towards 
vociferous small-nation nationalism (Saunders Lewis was a some time admirer of Maurras and 
Action Française and Andrew Dewar Gibb, the SNP leader of the late Thirties, hated the Irish 
immigrants in his native land and made no bones about it (Dixon, 1997).  
« What a curse to the earth are small nations » proclaimed the revolutionary socialist Scottish 
novelist Lewis Grassic Gibbon in 1934 (Grassic Gibbon 1934 : 144) and in doing so he was 
expressing the vigorous rejection of nationalism by many within the labour movement. By the 
time of the post-war Labour government of Clement Attlee, the Labour party had become in its 
own way as unionist as its Conservative enemies (to borrow a phrase from Tony Crosland) and 
this was to continue throughout the period of the post-war social democratic consensus which 
promised and to some extent delivered a more equal treatment between regions of Britain and 
guaranteed a minimum social protection for all – including those populations who had still in 
living  memory  the  inordinate  suffering  inflicted  upon  them  by  the  free  play  of  market 
mechanisms in the South of Wales and West of  Scotland during what  Kenneth Morgan has 
described as the « locust years » of the Great Depression (Morgan 2002 : 210-240).
The experience of office from 1945 to 1951 and again from 1964 to 1970 no doubt reinforced 
what had become the doxa within the Labour party, leadership and rank and file included, that 
only a central British state occupied by Labour could impose redistribution and effectively combat 
inter-regional inequalities. The Britishness of that central state was indeed more or less taken for 
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granted until the rude eruption of nationalism on the political scene from the late Sixties on. I will 
not go into any detail about the internal debate (or the lack of such debate) within the Labour 
party in these crucial years which saw both Plaid and the SNP become substantial political and 
electoral forces – substantial enough to force both the major political parties into a re-appraisal of 
the national question. Suffice to say that the Labour party’s conversion (or return, if you prefer) 
to Home Rule during the ill-fated governments of Wilson and Callaghan from 1974 to 1979 was 
a highly uneven process, one of whose most significant manifestations was a durable tension 
between a pragmatic/opportunistic leadership, struggling to keep the boat of government afloat 
through deals in parliament with the Liberals and others, and a party rank-and-file which was very 
far  from  enthusiastic  about  what  it  perceived  as  concessions  to  the  Nationalists.  This  is 
particularly clear in Scotland where the majority of the party in the seventies continued to see the 
SNP as Tories in national costume and Home Rule as a diversion from the real tasks at hand.
2. The Thatcher factor
What changed all this irremediably was the Conservative victory of the 3rd of May 1979, only a 
couple  of  months  after  the  referendum fiasco  in  Scotland  and  Wales.  Because  of  the  very 
radicality of Thatcherite policies,  largely inspired by the writings of Friedrich von Hayek, that 
great admirer of English XIXth century economic liberalism, but also because of the growing 
divergence in the perceptions of Thatcherism between a predominantly enthusiastic England (the 
populous South of England in particular) on the one hand and an increasingly hostile Scotland 
and Wales on the other, Thatcherite policies were to prepare the ground for a major shift in 
public  perceptions  in  both  of  these  two  countries  (McCrone  1992  ;  Brown  /  McCrone  / 
Paterson 1998). It is indeed during this period that the movement in favour of the recognition of 
Scotland’s national specificities grows in strength, although this is not necessarily reflected in the 
electoral results of the SNP, which does badly through much of the eighties. Nationalism, or at 
least the increasingly strident demand that Scotland and Wales should not be submitted to the 
repeated onslaughts of an  alien doctrine and of political  practices  which were inimical  to the 
dominant traditions of both these countries,  was to grow and above all  to spread across the 
boundaries of party politics during this period, perhaps more than ever before.
In the Scottish context, I would argue that there are two key factors which were to contribute 
vitally to creating the conditions in which New Labour was to emerge in the mid-nineties with its 
proposals for constitutional reform. The first of these is the shift within the intellectual and cultural  
fields which sees the emergence of a multifarious movement in favour of the critical rethinking of 
Scotland’s place within British history and within the contemporary political and cultural 
landscape. The second, not-unrelated phenomenon, is the emergence of a popular front of opposition 
to the constitutional status quo in the form of the Scottish Constitutional Convention (although no 
doubt some of the more staid members of that august assembly would be unhappy with the idea 
of them being anything as radical as a popular front).
I have no time here to go into the detail of the contribution of Scotland’s academics, writers and 
other  cultural  producers  in  the  rewriting  of  Scotland  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  and  the 
reactivation/invention  of  a  tradition  in  which  Scotland  stood  apart  in  its  defiance  of  the 
doctrinaire neo-liberalism being implemented down South with increasing fervour as we move 
through the decade. As Roderick Watson has argued (Watson 2007), there is a new flowering of 
Scottish culture during this period, in which few or any of the major actors are willing to publicly 
espouse the cause of unionist Conservatism. If we look at the names of the major figures of the 
period – Alasdair Gray, Jim Kelman, Tom Leonard, Liz Lochhead, Janice Galloway, Jackie Kay, 
Iain Banks, Willie McIlvanney, they read like a roll call of more or less militant anti-Thatcherism3. 
3 The only Scottish author of note to take sides with Conservative unionism was Alan Massie, although some 
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Similarly in the academic field, a vast amount of work was being carried out to call into question 
the historical myths of unionism, of which Scottish academia had been a major vector, and to 
redesign  the  contours  of  Scotland’s  past  and  present.  Cairns  Craig’s  Determinations series  at 
Polygon is one distinguished example among many others of the intellectual vitality of the period. 
The Series preface was quite clear in its intentions :
If the determinations which shape our experience are to come from within rather than from 
without, they have to be explored and evaluated and acted upon. Each volume in this series will 
seek to be a contribution to that self-determination; and each volume, we trust, will require a 
response, contributing in turn to the on-going dynamic that is Scotland’s culture. 
Much of this cultural and intellectual work was to find a strong echo in the vibrant journal and 
small magazine culture of the period, to which Radical Scotland was a major contributor.
In the political field, the Scottish Constitutional Convention grew, sometimes laboriously, out of 
the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, but above all out of the growing recognition that a broad 
coalition of forces in Scotland – from the womens’ movement to the local authorities, from the 
STUC to the Catholic Church, and from the Communists to the Liberals, and crucially including 
Labour - were opposed to the constitutional status quo and were willing to bury (some of) their 
differences  in  order  to  propose  a  reasoned  programme  of  constitutional  change  in  face  of 
Thatcherite immobility. No matter what the intentions of one or other of the actors may have 
been (the  Labour  desire  to isolate  the SNP or  the Liberals’  parallel  agenda  of  reforming an 
electoral  system  in  which  they  were  systematically  under-represented)  the  creation  of  the 
Convention and its  input  as  a  collective  intellectual into the political  debate constituted a  major 
turning point. It thus gave political form to - but also a particular political interpretation of  - the mass 
rejection of Thatcherism which had expressed itself not only in the ballot box in Scotland (and 
Wales)  since  1979  but  also  in  the  contribution  of  the  Scots  and  the  Welsh  to  the  major 
movements against the new faith in the market, in particular the 1984-85 miners strike and the « 
Can pay, won’t pay » campaign against the poll tax in the late eighties4.
3. The political inheritance of New Labour
This then is  what  Anthony Blair  inherited when he replaced John Smith at  the head of the 
Labour party in 1994 : a political party still in search of its position within a much changed British 
political field, now dominated by market thinking, but also a movement whose strengths lay on 
the periphery where the rejection of Anglo-centrism, in the caricatural form of  Thatcher and 
Major (warm beer and cricket...) was henceforth a force to be reckoned with and which the old 
incantations about the horrors of tartan Conservatism and separatist Welshness could no longer 
conjure away. From these two major constraints was to emerge that hybrid creature, Blairism. 
One must not undersestimate these symbolic constraints when measuring the « statesmanship » 
of Blair as constitutional reformer after 1997.
The dominant group within Blair’s New Labour party had no inherent reasons for being more 
attentive to demands for Home Rule than their immediate forebears. Blair himself had paid little 
attention to the national question since his election in 1983, and his base in the North East of 
England  did  not  naturally  predispose  him  in  favour  of  devolution.  The  new  leader  was 
surrounded by Scots – but they had been far from being unanimous in their support of Home 
Rule in earlier times. Indeed, Robin Cook had been active in his opposition to Home Rule during 
the 1979 referendum campaign. Although Gordon Brown had moved away from his proximity 
may have found it more diplomatic to hold their peace during a period of almost unanimous Scottish loathing of 
radical Thatcherite conservatism.
4 This campaign was to provide a platform for Tommy Sheridan, leader of Scottish Militant Labour ,and later of 
the Scottish Socialist Party, who was to be a major figure in parliamentary debates during the first two terms of 
the new Scottish parliamenet after 1999.
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with Scotland’s nationalist-leaning Left radicals of his early  Red Paper on Scotland years, he had 
nonetheless  led Labour’s  first  devolution campaign  in Scotland.  But  by the mid-nineties,  his 
preoccupations were no doubt elsewhere as he battled to locate himself at the centre of the New 
Labour machine. Neil Kinnock, who continued to haunt the corridors of Labour party power 
and to provide symbolic capital to the New Labour leadership, was himself only a recent convert 
to devolution, which he had combatted within the Welsh party in the 1970s. No doubt Labour 
leaders  on  the  periphery,  at  least  in  Scotland,  were  by  the  mid-nineties  obliged  to  position 
themselves differently from their Westminster- (or Brussels-) based colleagues, as popular and 
elite support for constitutional change built up. There is no reason to doubt that some of them, 
like Donald Dewar, had indeed been won over to the idea of hardy political decentralisation.
From a theoretical point of view, however, Labour in its « new » incarnation, although now 
officially the party of constitutional movement alongside the Liberal Democrats, had made little 
progress in rethinking the national question and remained as hostile as ever to expressions of 
nationalism which called into question the centrality or the future of the British state. Thus 
Anthony Giddens, who has something to say about almost everything in his strangely influential 
book, Beyond Left and Right (1994), pays scant attention to what he calls « local nationalisms » 
which he sees as a preoccupying symptom of backward reactions to the globalization process 
which in the main he embraces as a vector of modernization. Blair’s presentation of devolution in 
New Britain, after the singing the praise of its own modernism, insists on the unionist dimension 
of Labour’s devolution proposals (a position echoed in Scotland by George Robertson) and 
makes it clear where sovereingty will ultimately lie, even after the transfer of powers has been 
enacted : « The sovereignty of the UK parliament will remain undiminished ».
Nonetheless,  and  in  contradistinction  to  the  devolution  proposals  of  the  Wilson-Callaghan 
period,  once  in  office  in  1997  the  New  Labour  machine  moved  quickly  and  resolutely  to 
implement  its  1997  electoral  campaign  proposals,  carrying  an  admittedly  much-cowed  party 
machine and rank-and-file with it. The devolution proposals – largely inspired as far as Scotland 
was concerned by the detailed demands of the Constitutional Convention – were rapidly put to 
the vote through a referendum in September 1997, which showed substantial support for change 
in Scotland and an as yet lukewarm approval of the creation of a relatively weak assembly in 
Wales5. The legislation that was then to lead to the creation of the Scottish parliament and the 
Welsh assembly  in 1999 showed the lengths  to  which Labour was willing  to go to preserve 
support for its changes. The introduction of proportional representation, in particular, which self-
evidently was in contradiction with Labour’s immediate interests and condemned the party to 
coalition government in Scotland, illustrates this quite clearly.
Conclusion: New Labour radicalism or pusillanimous bricolage
In the debate that has accompanied the constitutional reforms of the successive New Labour 
governments since 1997, two polar positions have emerged. On the one hand, those who see 
these changes as indicators of the radicality of the New Labour government and of its resolute 
attachment to modernisation. Vernon Bogdanor is one of the most distinguished representatives 
of this view. He has argued in a text published at the end of the first  New Labour term of 
government that 
« The crucial consequence of the reforms of the Blair era, however, is to give us, for the first time 
in our history, a constitution; and, moreover, a constitution which is quasi-federal in nature. It 
can hardly be denied that this is a revolutionary change. » (Bogdanor 2001 : 146)
 This  indeed  is  hardly  denied  by  Peter  Mandelson,  garrulous  as  ever,  who  in  his  The  Blair  
5 74,3% of voters expressed their support for a Scottish parliament in the referendum of the 11th of September 
1997 (and 63,5% were in favour of tax-raising powers for the new parliament) whereas a week later in Wales 
only 50.1% voted in favour of the proposed assembly.
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Revolution  Revisited  describes  Blair’s  «  constitutional  revolution  »  as  «  the  most  extensive 
programme of constitutional modernisation for more than a century – indeed, since the Great 
Reform Act of 1832 » and adds significantly « which appears to have put to rest the serious 
nationalist threat in Scotland and, to a lesser extent, in Wales » (Mandelson 2002 : xxii)
At the other end of the spectrum, Tom Nairn, in After Britain (2000) and more recently in his 
introduction to the 2006 re-edition of The Break-up of Britain, has argued that the Canute-like 
reforms of New Labour are unlikely to hold back the rising tide of nationalism. Nothing more 
than a clumsy bricolage and a last-ditch attempt to save the unsaveable :
Underneath the present charades of apostasy and self-contempt, those deeper currents that have 
carried the break-up so far are not slackening, but acquiring new force. Just as the tide in favour 
of home rule built  up during the  eighteen years  of  Conservative Unionism, so the new tide 
seeking real independence is forming itself beneath the façade of Blairism. It will rise into the 
spaces left by New Labour’s collapse, and by the increasing misfortunes of the old Union state. 
(Nairn 2006 : introduction) 
Of the two positions, Nairn’s seems to be much closer to the real movement of history – indeed 
there is something strangely unhistorical in Bogdanor’s account. As if the massive shift in public 
and elite opinion, especially in Scotland, in the 1980s and early 1990s, were no more than the 
background music to Blairite reforms. However, Nairn’s own position returns us to a central 
issue only touched upon earlier in this paper : the fact that the anti-Thatcherite resistance of the 
1980s, strong and popular in both Scotland and Wales  resulted essentially in a movement in 
favour of a new constitutional set-up, leaving the rest of the Thatcherite legacy intact. Perhaps 
Lewis Grassic Gibbon was not entirely wrong when, looking to a self-governing future for 
Scotland, he stated with heavy irony :
It will profit Glasgow’s hundred and fifty thousand slum-dwellers so much to know that they are 
being starved and brutalized by Labour Exchanges and Public Assistance Committees staffed 
exclusively by Gaelic-speaking, haggis-eating Scots in saffron kilts and tongued brogues full of 
such Scottish ideals as those which kept men chained as slaves in Fifeshire mines a century or so 
ago. (Grassic Gibbon 1934 : 146)
The labour exchanges and public assistance committees have of course disappeared from 
neoliberal Scotland, and the forms of domination of the poor have indeed been modernized by 
New Labour’s Welfare to Work programmes. But one might be excused for believing that the 
underlying issue raised here by Grassic Gibbon remains painfully relevant.
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